Daniel Lubetzky

From an interesting article in Ha’aretz by Michalis Firillas

[T]he concept of hegemony . . . is almost comical in the era of globalization. The sheer number of real or imaginary powers vying for the limelight has made international political maneuvering so complex that real power is hard-pressed to manifest itself in historically familiar ways. Suddenly, "statesmen" are a dime a dozen, and what really matters is whether you are invited to a conference, not what you can actually achieve there.

Firillas goes on to ponder on how civil society and multilateral organizations will somewhat fill that void.

_19/07/2008

An end to hegemony?

_{By Michalis Firillas, Ha’aretz}

With great pomp and symbolism, the Union for the Mediterranean (UPM) was launched in Paris Sunday. It was an event most of the 43 leaders in attendance could have done without, but only the chronically eccentric Muammar Gadhafi intentionally opted to miss it. However much skepticism this new-old venture may stir among those who have seen it all by now, what French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner described as a "magnificent event" underlined two parallel developments that clearly reflect the era we are living in.
The first is the changing concept of hegemony. Notwithstanding Gadhafi’s criticism of the union as a "neocolonial" venture, its history – since its unveiling during the French presidential campaign last year – suggests otherwise. If Nicolas Sarkozy originally thought of the "Mediterranean Union" (as it was initially dubbed) as a launchpad for restoring France’s colonial influence circa 1900, since taking over the Elysee Palace he has come to recognize that in the 21st century, power does not come easy. Indeed, the first to check his Mediterranean ambition was France’s fraternal twin, Germany, which sharply opposed any notion that this venture would not include European Union involvement, and that it would be dominated – much less led – by Paris. Other EU Mediterranean countries, notably Spain, joined the fracas.
The Arab world, too, demanded equal treatment, which forced Sarkozy to share center stage with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who became his co-host. And then there were the Turks, fuming at what they perceived as Sarkozy’s ploy to keep them out of Europe by offering them a place in this "second-best," parallel club; they had to be convinced that this was not the intention.
Sarkozy had also been trying to muscle in on the diplomatic void left by a Bush administration on the wane (or perhaps it is U.S. hegemony itself that is in a downward spiral). France’s role as peacemaker in the Middle East, however, was dulled by a Syrian president who was adamant about not making any gestures – polite or otherwise – that would hint that he acknowledged the presence of Israel’s prime minister at the gathering. But Sarkozy could argue it was an improvement over Annapolis in 2007, to which Syria sent only a mid-level official (although the exchanges between Ehud Olmert and President Bashar Assad were handled by Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, who shuttled between them).
Similarly, France’s weight in Lebanon is apparently not quite what it used to be, and although Sarkozy did manage to get Lebanese President Michel Suleiman and Assad to agree on restoration of official diplomatic ties, on two levels his success was less significant than was claimed. Suleiman had been backed by pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon anyway, and the real hard work – defusing Lebanon’s political crisis – was carried out by an emerging diplomatic mini-power: Qatar.
Indeed, the concept of hegemony, French or anyone else’s for that matter, is almost comical in the era of globalization. The sheer number of real or imaginary powers vying for the limelight has made international political maneuvering so complex that real power is hard-pressed to manifest itself in historically familiar ways. Suddenly, "statesmen" are a dime a dozen, and what really matters is whether you are invited to a conference, not what you can actually achieve there.
This, of course, makes the next conference – and its organizers – important. For example, once France’s tenure at the EU helm ends in another six months, the Czechs take over, and this has prompted Czech Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra to vow that if "this is the year of the Mediterranean, next year it will be a year for Eastern Europe."
But it is the second development, quieter, subtler, that deserves more serious attention – perhaps as a successor to the concept of hegemony. Since the Barcelona Process was initiated, in 1995, an army of academics, artists and activists – bolstered by official acquiescence, if not always outright support, and by financial backing, mostly from the EU – has steadily promoted shared causes and projects across the Euro-Mediterranean region, under the generic umbrella of civil society. True, much of this activity has not contributed sufficiently to bringing democracy, or basic freedoms, to the Middle East and North Africa, and the hue of post-modernist relativism that emerges from many of the shared efforts often undermines fundamental human rights. Nonetheless, they have been making inroads. A prime example of this broad effort is the work of the Anna Lindh Foundation, which promotes intercultural dialogue across the Euro-Mediterranean region and cooperative projects, often with official sponsorship.
So, if the UPM cannot be a political union, with a real power agenda, then let us hope that the projects it funds will advance, in a more concrete fashion, the socio-cultural efforts and economic investments that began in Barcelona.
Michalis Firillas is an editor at Haaretz English edition, and blogs on Worldview (http://firillas.blogspot.com).